A Little Bit Country and a Little Bit Rock and Roll

DATE June 12, 2007 ACCOUNT NUMBER N/A
TIME 12:00 Noon-1:00 PM AUDIENCE N/A
NETWORK NPR
PROGRAM Fresh Air

Interview: Dennis Ross, author of "Statecraft" and ex-Middle East
peace negotiator, on how to build statecraft and what needs to be
done in parts of the Middle East
TERRY GROSS, host:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

My guest Dennis Ross is the chief Middle East peace negotiator in the
administrations of Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush. Ross is now a
distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He's
written a new book called "Statecraft: How to Restore America's Standing in
the World." As we'll hear later, he's critical of George W. Bush for his
administration's absence of statecraft.

Dennis Ross, welcome to FRESH AIR. Now, you recently traveled to Jerusalem
and Ramallah. And you say that the big issue wasn't the stalemate in the
peace process, it was the conflict between the Palestinian organizations Hamas
and Fatah and whether Gaza was already lost to the Islamists. Would you
describe the fear that Gaza is becoming an Islamist enclave?

Mr. DENNIS ROSS: Interestingly enough, what I heard from Israelis and
Palestinians alike, although there wasn't uniformity on either side, is that
Gaza was already lost, and it was well on its way to becoming an Islamist
enclave which they called Hamastan. And the danger they saw was that this
would create a sense of accomplishment, add for the momentum to the
Islamists--not only among the Palestinians, but regionwide--and would also be
a kind of enclave where weapons and terrorists and people from Iran and from
Lebanon, meaning Hezbollah, would be coming and providing training. And it
would, in a sense, it would radiate outwards. It wouldn't be something that
would be isolated or so easily isolated.

Worse, from an Israeli standpoint, was the fear that much larger weapons--in
terms of capability, quality, range--would be smuggled in and suddenly it
wouldn't only be Sderot, the town that's just across the border that would be
subjected to rocket fire, it could be many other cities in Israel, as well.

GROSS: What are the signs that Gaza has already become an Islamist enclave?

Mr. ROSS: The most profound sign, cited by both, was the military prowess of
Hamas, the build-up that Hamas has had militarily, the infrastructure it's
developing and its capacity to go after leading Fatah figures, leading Fatah
security targets and be successful in terms of most engagements. Having said
that, there were many others who said, `Look, they may have the upper hand,'
meaning Hamas may have the upper hand, `but they don't have control. There
are 47 militias within Gaza. There's a struggle ongoing, and one shouldn't
write Gaza off, certainly before it takes place.'

GROSS: Would you say that the majority of the Palestinians who live in Gaza
are Islamists?

Mr. ROSS: I would not say that. I would say that the majority of
Palestinians in Gaza right now are neither. They're not Islamists, they're
not for Fatah. They want to have a normal life. They would like to see law
and order restored. Gaza has become almost Hobbesian in terms of its
lawlessness, its anarchy. I mentioned 47 militias. What most Gazans right
now would actually like to see is some order. Kidnappings are the order of
the day. Gunfights are the order of the day. People increasingly find it
difficult to do anything, and the functional unemployment in Gaza right now is
approaching 70 percent.

GROSS: What would it mean for the possibility of a Middle East peace, or a
two-state solution, if Gaza remains Islamist?

Mr. ROSS: Well, it really makes it difficult to produce a two-state solution
as it was originally conceived. For Palestinians, they've always said a
Palestinian state would be the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza, and that
this is an integrated, territorial unit, in their words. So if Gaza's not
part of it, you have probably 1.3 million Palestinians who are in Gaza who are
not part of a Palestinian state because they're somehow removed because they
reject the idea of a two-state solution, at least the leaders who are there or
who dominate the scene reject it. Then it's pretty hard to envision a
two-state solution the way we have in the past.

On the other hand, some of the Palestinians I've talked to said, `Look, let's
make the West Bank work. Let's connect it, at least in a confederal way,
starting economically, to Jordan, maybe even some connection economically to
the Israelis. Let's show, in contrast to Gaza, how well this works and maybe
over time we'll be able to convince those who are in Gaza to rise up against
Hamas or we, in Fatah, in the independence, will have the strength to be able
to compete because we have a successful model. And if we don't, we'll just
have a three-state solution.'

Now, I find the notion of a three-state solution pretty implausible, in part
because I think psychologically Palestinians can never really accept that they
won't have a state that has both Gaza and the West Bank in it. I think the
potential for Gaza to be a continuing source of turmoil and trouble,
especially if you can't isolate it from a military standpoint and the Israelis
feel the need to go back in, I just see it as a continuing source of
difficulty and conflict which will make any stable two-state solution highly
unlikely.

GROSS: Well, let's get back to the idea of the plan to try to make the West
Bank an alternative to Gaza, you know, something that works economically and
politically in the hopes that the people in Gaza would say, `Well, we don't
want these extremists. We prefer what's happening in the West Bank. We
prefer that kind of life.' What would that take, and how likely do you think
it is that could happen?

Mr. ROSS: Well, one interesting thing that I did find--and I must say,
having been over there, it was not a time of feeling particularly hopeful and
optimistic, even though I'm normally someone who's always looking for ways to
solve problems. The fact is, what was interesting at the end of this trip--
after hearing a lot about Iran, hearing a lot about Syria, hearing a lot about
Hezbollah, seeing turmoil everywhere--I also heard from a wide range of
Palestinians--and I saw over 30 of them--covering what I call the old guard of
Fatah, the young guard of Fatah, the second and third generation of Fatah, and
a number of independents as well. I saw recognition that those in the West
Bank felt, `Look, if we can't get our act together, if we can't begin to
organize ourselves at the grass roots, if we can't make and build our
institutions and show that they can work, we don't have a future as a people;
we don't have a future as a nation.' And I think that's an important potential
development.

So in answer to your question, I guess what I would say is, building from the
ground up, building institutions from the ground up, assuming a culture of
accountability, demonstrating that with some help and connection to Jordan and
from donors in the outside who invest in serious private sector efforts within
the West Bank--which, by the way, is a lot better off economically even today
than Gaza is--then you could begin to create a functioning, viable economic
political and social reality in the West Bank. And it could stand up as
something that shows Palestinians there is a way forward. I don't mean to
suggest that it's disconnected from a political process, because Palestinians
have to feel there's also a prospect for achieving the national aspiration,
but I think first things first, creating organization at the grass roots
level, demonstrating that in fact you can compete with the Islamists is
definitely a starting point.

GROSS: Would that organization likely be Fatah or an alternative to Fatah?

Mr. ROSS: It's going to be Fatah, even though it's going to have to be Fatah
in a way that I call rebranding Fatah, because the Fatah name, as it were,
while it's still synonymous with the national movement, is also synonymous now
with corruption and selfishness. So you've got to create a demonstration that
Fatah can remake itself and be responsive to people's needs, not to the needs
of the movement or the faction. So I think it would be Fatah.

And one of the reasons I say that, again, it's not me so much saying it as the
people I talked to, including independents who said, `Look, there's no third
way for Palestinians. It's either going to be Fatah or Hamas. These are the
only two seriously organized movements that exist. There are lots of
offshoots, splinter groups from each. The key is not to look for some kind of
third force, third way that's independent. The key is to make Fatah work.'

GROSS: Well, your new book is called "Statecraft." Do you think that there's
a place for American diplomacy in trying to prevent Gaza and the West Bank
from becoming Islamist?

Mr. ROSS: I do. And I think one of the keys to statecraft, as I describe in
the book, is that you have to have reality-based assessments; you can't have
faith-based assessments. You have to do a hard-headed look at what the
situation is. And if you want to change it, you have to understand it well
before you can change it.

So first things first, I would focus on this competition between Fatah and
Hamas, because even if we have a political process, or even if we produce a
cease-fire--which in a sense is something I call for in the book--the fact is,
whether you have a cease-fire or you have a political process, both will end
up being largely irrelevant if Hamas ends up winning this competition, number
one.

Number two, even if one wants Hamas to change, the best prospect of changing
Hamas so that it comes to accept co-existence is if it has internal
competition, politically, economically and socially. People tend to forget
that Hamas built its following--to the extent that it has it--not on the basis
of jihad alone. It built it on the basis of what's known as the dowa.
Literally, this has been the place where Hamas built recruitment, provided
social services, in a sense created a social underpinning, a social welfare
system. And what, in a sense, smart statecraft would do right now is to focus
on how to compete and help those who want to compete with the Islamistists as
part of a larger strategy. As I say, it wouldn't take the place, necessarily,
of going for a comprehensive cease-fire, which would have to be worked out in
great detail. It wouldn't take the place even of trying to develop a
political process that would point the way towards larger political issues.
But if you pursue those two tracks and you don't pursue this particular track,
you're not going to achieve where you want to go anyway.

So smart statecraft at this point would recognize what the situation is, would
identify with those people who want to remake Fatah, would organize the donor
community--including the Saudis in the Gulf states--to work with those who are
prepared to work for themselves in Fatah. And I very much met with those who
I saw are prepared to roll up their sleeves, organize themselves, remake Fatah
for their own reasons, for their own salvation, not as a favor to anybody on
the outside.

GROSS: So who are the countries that you think have a vested interest in
preventing the Gaza and the West Bank from becoming militant Islamist
enclaves?

Mr. ROSS: Well, certainly we do. I would say the Europeans do. And I would
also say the Saudis, the Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia. This
becomes part and parcel of a larger struggle with those who want to transform
the Middle East and turn the clock back, as it were. I would say the Saudis,
in particular, who don't want this conflict--meaning the Palestinian
conflict--to be exploited by Iran, they don't want it to be a stick that is
used against them, they have a real interest in insuring that Hamas doesn't
take over all the Palestinian institutions, because it'll guarantee enduring
conflict. And if that's the case, you're going to find that the Saudis will
find that this is a problem that is used against them. And the Saudis and the
other Gulf states certainly have the wherewithal to help invest in an
alternative to the Islamistists.

GROSS: My guest is Dennis Ross. He was the chief Middle East peace
negotiator in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. His
new book is called "Statecraft." We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH
AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is Dennis Ross. He was the chief
Middle East chief negotiator in the Clinton administration. Before that, in
the administration of George H.W. Bush, he served as director of the State
Department's Policy Planning Office. His new book is called "Statecraft: How
to Restore America's Standing in the World."

Well, we've been talking about the fears that Gaza has become an Islamist
enclave, and that the same might be starting to happen in the West Bank. Now,
Syria has supported Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel has reportedly approached
Syria about peace talks, approached Syria through third party
channels--reportedly Germany and Turkey. What do you think Syria's motive is
in being interested in talks with Israel?

Mr. ROSS: I think that Syria--certainly President Asad--probably sits on the
fence right now between two different alternatives: one being pursuing peace
with Israel, and the other is actually ending up in a conflict with Israel. I
think two factors may influence him. One obviously is the Golan Heights. It
would be a stunning achievement if Syria could get the Golan Heights back.
His father certainly wanted to do so, and in the end didn't succeed.

The other would be--and I think this is the main preoccupation of the
regime--there's an international tribunal that is now set to be established
after June 10th. I guess starting this week, I think. And that international
tribunal would, in fact, prosecute those responsible for the killing of the
former prime minister of Lebanon, Hariri. And the Syrians know that the
investigation to date points a pretty large finger at the Syrian leadership.
So for someone like Bashar Asad, trying to get out from under that tribunal
may be one of his main motivations. If it looks like he thinks that he's
making Syria indispensable to peace, that might reduce the incentives in the
international community to pursue the tribunal to its final results.

GROSS: Is there anyone in Hamas or Fatah for Israel to negotiate with?

Mr. ROSS: Well, I certainly believe there's someone within Fatah, and that
is Abu Mazen, the president of the Palestinian Authority, and the people
around him. I think there is a value in talking to him. I think there is a
value in creating a political process. I think we should also, at the same
time, recognize what's possible and what isn't. One of the complaints I've
had about the administration's approach on this is they've been pursuing...

GROSS: The Bush administration or the Israeli?

Mr. ROSS: The Bush administration. The Bush administration's approach has
been to--and this is what the secretary of state wants to do--is to pursue a
political horizon. Now, he means by political horizon the contours of
a...(unintelligible)...agreement, which would resolve the issues of Jerusalem,
refugees and borders.

Now, these are the existential questions. They involve the toughest
compromises that are going to be have to be made by each side. And we're
looking at a divided leadership, on the Palestinian side. Abu Mazen's
intentions are clearly, in my mind, good intentions, but his capabilities are,
at best, limited. In the case of the prime minister of Israel, you have
someone with a 2 percent approval rating, which, of course, is within the
margin of errors of the polls. So you're at a point where you have extremely
weak leaders who are not really capable of making what I call compromises on
the existential issues. So if you force them to deal with those questions,
you're not going to produce very good responses.

Now, if you had the Arab world prepared to embrace the core trade-offs on
Jerusalems, refugees, borders and security, that would be one thing. And the
Arab League resolution demonstrates there's a readiness to maintain a
commitment to a two-state solution. But all you got out of the Arab League
resolution was, basically, a commitment to a two-state solution and an
umbrella to begin negotiations, not an umbrella for concluding them.

So if you're not at a point where the circumstances, where the reality permits
you to take on that kind of a question, all you're doing is you're creating an
objective that you can't achieve. Again, from a statecraft perspective, one
of the things you don't want to do is create objectives that are completely
divorced from your means, because you end up discrediting yourselves and your
objectives.

GROSS: After years of trying to negotiate peace between Israelis and
Palestinians, what is like for you to watch Palestinians fighting with each
other? And are similar problems coming up in the way Palestinians are
reacting to each other as, you know, compared to the way they reacted to
Israelis?

Mr. ROSS: One of the interesting things is, someone like me takes a look at
this, is that I really sort of regret seeing a complete loss of a sense of
possibility and a credible peace process, which we have not really had since
2001. I say that in answer to your question because the internal fighting
among Palestinians is, at least in part, triggered by a sense of hopelessness.
If you have a sense of hope, then groups, the Islamistists, have much less
upon which to make their case. When there's hopelessness, they're in a much
stronger position. The more we see fragmentation among Palestinians,
ironically, of course, then the harder it is to make peace.

You've got to start with a base line of Palestinians who have objectives and
can deliver on those objectives. Right now, those who have objectives in
Hamas are pursuing a set of objectives that are against the very idea of a
two-state solution, against the idea of co-existence and in favor of the
creation of an Islamic state. They might accept cease-fires and truces with
the Israelis for certain periods of time, and there can be a value for that,
just in terms of preventing the killing, but the truth is, in terms of trying
to create peace and try to foster reconciliation and co-existence, Hamas
represents a move in the wrong direction. And the intra-Palestinian fighting
at one level, obviously, is symptomatic of how difficult it's going to be now
to try to move towards peace.

Having said all that, again, I still retain a sense of possibility because I
look at polls among Palestinians that still show 70 percent to 75 percent who
would like to see a two-state solution. And that suggests that the mainstream
of the Palestinians don't accept the political agenda of Hamas.

GROSS: One of your criticisms of Palestinians in the Middle East peace
negotiation process, back when you were actively participating in that, was
that they used their historic victimization as a negotiating strategy. Now,
when you're dealing with two Palestinian groups trying to get power from each
other, you know, trying to compete for power with each other, then the
victimization of Palestinians isn't an issue because that's something that
both groups share.

Mr. ROSS: Right, but I'll tell you...

GROSS: So do you see--yeah, go ahead.

Mr. ROSS: I was going to say, where it comes into play is that a strategy of
victimization creates a sense of entitlement. It creates a sense that you're
never the one at fault, you never made any mistakes, you never have to learn
from it, and ultimately you're never responsible. One of the things that has
to change is the development of a culture of accountability and the need for
Palestinians, in the first instance, to be accountable to themselves. The
more they develop a culture of accountability, the more they have a sense that
someone on the Palestinian side has to be responsible for Palestinians. The
more, at some point, they'll be capable of being responsible to others, as
well.

That's why I say that what I see now, among Fatah, at least, is much more of a
recognition that they have to, in a sense, roll up their sleeves, they have to
show they can produce, they have to show they can be responsible, they have to
show they can be accountable. And in a sense, the more they do that, the more
they put Hamas in a similar position. Bear in mind that Hamas is both a
government and a movement. Whenever there's been a conflict between the
movement and the government, it's always the movement that has dominated, to
this point. I would suggest that the more that Fatah becomes effective in
competing, the more the Hamas government is going to have to feel--or at least
the internal Hamas is going to feel that they're going to have to show they
can also be responsible and deliver for Palestinians.

GROSS: Dennis Ross is the author of the new book "Statecraft: How to Restore
America's Standing in the World." He was the chief Middle East peace
negotiator in the administrations of Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush. Ross
will be back in the second half of the show. I'm Terry Gross, and this is
FRESH AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross, back with Dennis Ross. He was
the chief Middle East peace negotiator in the administrations of George H.W.
Bush and Bill Clinton. He's currently a distinguished fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Ross is critical of the current
administration's lack of statecraft. He's written a new book called
"Statecraft: How to Restore America's Standing in the World."

How do you think US diplomacy could be used now in stopping Iran's nuclear
program?

Mr. ROSS: Well, again, I take a look at where we are, and one of the things
I see is that we have an objective of stopping Iran's nuclear program, and we
have diplomacy--that I describe as slow motion diplomacy--working through the
Security Council. The good news about that is that there is a consensus that
Iran shouldn't have a nuclear weapon expressed through the Security Council.
There is a consensus that Iran, in fact, should stop this program. That's the
good news.

The bad news is the pace at which the diplomacy is proceeding is not keeping
pace with the effort to develop a nuclear capability. So what we're going to
have to do, if we're going to bring our objectives and means into line, is
focus on how we can accelerate and intensify the pressure on Iran, using
economic means in particular.

I'm hopeful in this regard because we've seen that even limited sanctions
produced a public debate within the Iranian leadership. Understand that
everybody in the Iranian leadership wants to have nuclear weapons. They see
it as a symbol of national power, they see it through a defensive lens, they
see it through an offensive lens, they see it giving them great strength
within the region as a whole, where they feel they have a right to dominate.
All these factors notwithstanding, we've also seen that there are many within
the leadership. I would say the mullahs represented by Rafsanjani, the
liberalizers represented by Hatami, they are very much aware of the cost of
isolation. They don't want to pay an economic price that threatens, in their
view, social tranquility within Iran. So we have leverage.

One of the keys right now is to get the Europeans, who've been keen on
applying pressure against Iran in an incremental way, get them to accelerate
it. One way that I would try to affect the Europeans is basically to work
with the Saudis. The Saudis have enormous financial holdings within Europe.
The Saudis view an Iran with nuclear weapons almost as much of a threat as the
Israelis do. From the Saudi standpoint, an Iran with nuclear weapons has a
nuclear shield behind which to engage in coercion and subversion. And from a
Saudi standpoint, it goes to the heart of what they're facing with Iran right
now. They see themselves in a competition. They see themselves in a
struggle.

Now, if the Saudis understand for their own reasons--not because we want them
to--that they could help, in effect, change the European approach to the
Iranians, ratchet up the economic pressure, cut off what are close to $20
billion a year in credit guarantees to companies doing business with Iran, cut
off access in Europe to Iranian banks, get European banks and investment
houses not to do business with Iran, all of this could be done in parallel to
the efforts that are under way at the Security Council, and yet would very
much concentrate the mind of those within the Iranian leadership who
understand the cost of pursuing a nuclear weapons program in terms of what its
impact could be within Iran itself.

GROSS: You have a lot of inside contacts around the world, and I don't know
how many you have inside the Bush administration now, but I am wondering, do
you think that the president is seriously considering attacking Iran?

Mr. ROSS: When the president says that the military option has not been
taken off the table, I believe that that's serious. I do think the balance of
forces within the administration at this point is heavily in favor of not
using force against Iran. And I think the key here is, in a sense, to begin
to demonstrate that Iran's behavior will be changed. Those within the
administration who favored the use of force would be those who would say, and
point to the diplomists and say, `Look, you succeeded in producing
international sanction against Iran, but you haven't succeeded in changing
Iranian behavior, and we really can't live with an Iran with nuclear weapons.'

So while the balance of forces is tilted within the administration against
those who would make that argument, it could change over time if we find by
the end of the year that Iran crosses the threshold in terms of being able to
enrich uranium. They're clearly getting close to being able to do that. They
haven't solved all the technological problems, so we still have time to
prevent that. And that's why I think a real effort to ratchet up the economic
pressures right now are really essential.

GROSS: I know that, you know, in your view of statecraft, there needs to be
carrots and sticks, and the threat of force can be a very effective threat
while negotiations are going on. So either, you know, there's a kind of
peaceful resolution to something or there's the threat of force. Do you think
that the Bush administration has been using the threat of force against Iran
in an effective way?

Mr. ROSS: I think it's hard for them to use it effectively right now because
the Iranians perceive us as being so tied down in Iraq, and seeing themselves
as having leverage on our position in Iraq, that's it not so easy, point one.
Point two, when the secretary of state, in advance of the Sharm el-Sheikh
conference that was held last month, on a number of occasions appealed for the
Iranians to send their foreign minister at a time when the Iranians had said
they were going to send a representative but they hadn't settled on a level,
that also sent a message that somehow we were desperate to be dealing with
them. Ahmadinejad came out and said that the US had approached them 41 times.
Again, I'm a big believer in engagement. I don't think we should be afraid of
it, but I think it's very important to do it in a way where you send a message
that you don't need the other side more than they need you. I think that's
the key.

You asked about the issue of force. I'm not sure they particularly believe
it, but I do think one can make them more mindful of where the administration
is going by the kinds of training exercises that are being held. And I do
think, at the same time, you have to bear in mind that you're trying to bring
the Europeans along. So here's an area where there's a kind of tension. The
more you focus on the use of force, the more you make the Europeans nervous.
Now, if they think what they have to do to head you off from doing that is to
engage in more economic pressure, that's a good thing. If they think that
whatever they do isn't going to make a difference and you're determined to use
force, that's a bad thing.

GROSS: My guest is Dennis Ross. He was the chief Middle East peace
negotiator in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. His
new book is called "Statecraft." We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH
AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: My guest is Dennis Ross, and he was the chief Middle East peace
negotiator in the Clinton administration, and before that in the
administration of George H.W. Bush. Ross served as director of the State
Department's Policy Planning Office. He's now a distinguished fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book is called
"Statecraft: How to Restore America's Standing in the World."

During the lead-up to the Gulf War and during the Gulf War--this was in 1990
and '91--you were in the State Department of President George H.W. Bush, and
you write a little bit in your new book "Statecraft" about watching James
Baker, who was then secretary of state, putting together the coalition for the
Gulf War. Give us an example of something he did in putting together the
coalition that you considered to be a really good example of wise statecraft.

Mr. ROSS: I'll give you a couple of examples, because I think they really
stand out, and they stand in stark contrast to what was done in Bush
administration 43. Number one, he traveled frequently to other capitals,
including, for example, Turkey--but not only Turkey--when he was putting
together the coalition. All these capitals that he went to, every time he did
it, he gave the leaders he was meeting a public platform to demonstrate that
the US was being solicitous of their views, not trying to impose on them.
Because every one of his visits, what he said in public was, `We're here to
consult on what to do.' In private, he would say, `Look, we're going to take
these steps, we'd really like you to be with us. What can we do that makes it
easier for you to be with us?' So the public element of his trips were very
much geared towards, in a sense, creating a political explanation for his
host. We were never putting them in the corner, we were never trying to
impose on them. We gave them, in a sense, a rationale for doing what they
were doing, and we gave them the ability to explain it to their own publics.

Connected to those trips, he understood that certain countries, like Turkey
and Egypt, would pay an enormous economic price if they joined the coalition,
given their economic ties--in a sense, dependency--on Iraq. So he put
together what came to be known as his "tin cup" exercises. What he did is
raise money from the Saudis and others, and the Germans and Japanese who
weren't going to commit forces but could commit resources, he used the tin cup
exercises to help sustain those who would find it difficult to be part of the
coalition. So on the one hand, he made it easier for countries to join. And
on the other hand, he made it easier for them to sustain their involvement in
the coalition.

GROSS: Now, in saying that he gave the countries who he wanted to be part of
the coalition an argument that they could use to make to their own people,
compare that to how you think President George W. Bush handled trying to put
together a coalition.

Mr. ROSS: Well, I think the essence of what we were doing was, you know,
under the rubric of `Make the UN relevant. You're going to make yourself
irrelevant if you don't join us.' I mean, I'm not saying that there was no
effort to bring others into the coalition, because there was. But contrast,
for example, Turkey. In 1990-'91, and in the year 2000, 2002, 2003, Turkey
was critical to a coalition. You could argue even more critical in 2003
because the original military plan called for, in fact, not using just air
forces but ground forces staging out of Turkey into northern Iraq. What
happened in each case is that the Bush administration, in 2002-2003, as
opposed to 1991, never sent anybody above the deputy secretary of defense to
Turkey. Now, that's fine to send the deputy secretary of defense, except that
when you're sending him there, almost by definition it's clear that this is
all about the use of force. When you're sending the secretary of state--who,
by the way, went three times to Turkey from August of 1990 until January of
1991--the president of the United States called the Turkish leader between 55
and 60 times in the same time frame. It became part of the Turkish public
story, how their leader Ozal was talking to President Bush, his friend. And
that was a very credible thing.

You didn't have anything comparable to that in 2002-2003. And yet, when the
vote in the Turkish parliament was conducted on whether or not to allow us to
use force in there, it lost by three out of 514 cast. Now, the mood in Turkey
was pretty negative towards the use of force in 2002-2003, but it was also
pretty negative in the year 1990-/'91. So you have a pretty interesting
contrast, in terms of how things were done then and how things were done more
recently.

GROSS: You write a little bit in your book about working with President
Clinton as, you know, as his Middle East peace negotiator. And you say you
did a good cop/bad cop thing with Clinton, but typically in a situation like
that, the negotiator is the good cop, except you played the role of the bad
cop and Clinton played the role of the good cap. How come?

Mr. ROSS: I think one thing you need in any negotiation is for everybody to
be authentic. And one thing about President Clinton, he had a capacity to use
his incredible empathy and marry it to his understanding of detail to convince
those he was dealing with that he understood why what he was asking them was
the hardest thing they'd ever have to do. And he could do it in a very
compelling way. It wasn't his strength, and it wasn't really who he was to
engage in what I call the tough love, to be the one to spell out all the
consequences if they didn't cross a certain threshold. So inevitably, the
division of labor became one where it was more natural for me to be the bad
cop and for him to be the good cop.

GROSS: But I think at the very end of the Clinton administration, in January,
just days before he left office, when things were still on the edge with
Yasser Arafat, that you basically tried to push Clinton into playing the bad
cop to get Arafat to commit to a peace plan.

Mr. ROSS: It's true. In the very last meeting at the White House, on
January 2nd, 2001, I felt it was really important for the president to make it
clear to Arafat that he would hold him personally responsible, that he was, in
a sense, by saying no to what the president had offered, he was making the
president a failure. I wanted him to communicate it that way to Yasser
Arafat, and he did convey a blunt message, but it was more geared towards that
Arafat was killing Barak and there was nothing more that Clinton could do.
Now, if you listen to that, that's a tough message. It's a blunt message.
But for someone like Arafat, who didn't much care about the impact he had on
Israelis, and who might have cared about the impact he had on Americans, it
probably wasn't the right message. The real question in the end is whether
any message would have made a difference. I came to the conclusion that
Arafat was simply incapable of transforming himself. He was simply incapable
of being able to end the conflict, and so even if the president had conveyed
the kind of really blunt message that I wanted, we probably still wouldn't
have succeeded.

GROSS: Why do you think Arafat was incapable of really ending the conflict?

Mr. ROSS: I think fundamentally he was a man of the 1950s. He was a
national liberation leader. He saw himself in historic terms. The movement
itself came to define him, and he couldn't live without a movement. He
couldn't live without grievance. He couldn't live without a cause. He
couldn't live without struggle. And we were asking him to do what was the
hardest thing for him: end the conflict. Which meant no more claims, no more
grievance, no more struggle, no more cause. And that was something he
couldn't do. He could live with the process, he couldn't live with the
conclusion. And I think in the end, I wish that I had recognized that earlier
because I would've reshaped our objectives. Here's a good example of what I
mean by statecraft.

GROSS: How? How would you have done that? Yeah, go ahead. Uh-huh?

Mr. ROSS: The key to good statecraft is always focusing on the objectives
that you can achieve based upon understanding the situation that you're in and
the means you can bring to bear. If, in fact, I were redefining what we
would've done, I would've come up with a different set of objectives based
upon the following test. I would've gone to Arafat and whoever the Israeli
prime minister was at the time, before we entered permanent status
negotiations, and I would've said, `We can't solve the core issues of this
conflict with you--Jerusalem, refugees and borders--unless you are prepared
publicly to go say to your people that each of you know you're going to have
to compromise, each of you know you will not get 100 percent of what you want
on Jerusalem, refugees and borders.'

Now, had we required that of each side, my guess is that Arafat wouldn't have
been able to do it, because he wasn't prepared to compromise on those issues,
because, in a sense, they went too much to the heart of his own definition of
the cause. If he hadn't been able to do that, then we would've gone back to
him and said, `You know what? It's clear you can't really compromise on the
core issues. We're not going to walk away from this process, but we're not
going to focus on the permanent status issues. Instead, what we're going to
do is: we're going to create as our process now increasing this scope of
independence of Palestinians from Israelis, increasing the ties between the
Israeli and Palestinian societies, improving the economic situation and, in a
sense, creating a context where life got better for both sides where the
extent of independence for Palestinians became more profound, where there
might have been some additional withdrawals from territories by the Israelis.
But we wouldn't have tackled the core issues that we couldn't solve. We
would've created a context where we could tackle those after Arafat was gone.

GROSS: Now, you say in your book "Statecraft" that anger can be a diplomatic
tool if used sparingly. What's an example of a time you really like blew your
lid, either for theatrical purposes or because you just couldn't take it any
more?

Mr. ROSS: Right. You know, the interesting thing, and I say it in the book,
anger is an effective tool if you use it at the right moment. In my case, I
have to say that every single time that I used it, I never controlled myself
the way I intended to. I meant to express it, but I always blew up far beyond
my intention. It's always credible when you're at a point where it's
believable that you would be fed up. So in my case, I was negotiating the
Hebron agreement, and I had been out there for what was close to 20 days at
this point, working around the clock. And I had asked Yasser Arafat the night
before to tell me what he really needed, because I couldn't stay out much
longer, and so he uncharacteristically ticked off six items of what he needed.
Very uncharacteristic for him to be that clear, that focused, that precise.
And so, I said, `OK, I'm going to go try to get these things.' And I went and
I spent the rest of the night--I left him around a little after midnight or 1
in the morning in Bethlehem, and I went and I saw then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu, and I worked with him until about 5 in the morning, and we worked
out a way to address all the issues that Arafat said he needed.

When I went back to see Arafat the next day, he suddenly denied that he'd
asked for these things. And so when it was clear that he was denying this,
and he asked if I was calling him a liar, I said to him, `If the shoe fits.'
And I got up, walked out of the meeting, opened these double doors that
separated us from our respective teams--we were meeting alone--and I had a
binder which was a fairly big binder, and I decided to throw it to show how
angry I was. Now, what I didn't know is that there was a pitcher of
grapefruit juice about 15 feet away, and I wish I was that accurate normally,
because I probably could've pursued several other careers. I hit the pitcher
flat on; it exploded. And I can tell you that my team and the Palestinian
team were absolutely horrified. But the point had been made that I was really
angry. And we proceeded to get a deal after that. Now, if you use anger at
the wrong moment, you know, before you're at a point where it's credible that
you're fed, where it's credible that you've sort of exhausted everything that
can be done, including yourself, then you're less likely to have the impact.

GROSS: Dennis Ross, thanks so much for talking with us.

Mr. ROSS: It was a pleasure. Thank you.

GROSS: Dennis Ross is the author of the new book "Statecraft." He's now a
distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Coming up, Ken Tucker reviews "Crazy Ex-Girlfriend," Miranda Lambert's second
CD which, like her first, debuted at number one on the country music chart.
This is FRESH AIR.

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Review: Ken Tucker on Miranda Lambert's sophomore album,
"Crazy Ex-Girlfriend"
TERRY GROSS, host:

"Crazy Ex-Girlfriend" is Miranda Lambert's second album. Both debuted at
number one on the country music charts. Part of this seemingly instant fame
may have to do with Lambert's third place finalist status on a season of TV's
"Nashville Star," the country music version of "American Idol." But rock
critic Ken Tucker thinks it's also because Miranda Lambert, still in her 20s,
is just that good.

(Soundbite of "Guilty in Here")

Ms. MIRANDA LAMBERT: (Singing) God knows I tried everything I could
To stay inside tonight
But that boy's like a sore in your mouth
That you just have to fight

This number one is shaking hands
With numbers two and three
Is it guilty in here,
Or is it just me?

(End of soundbite)

KEN TUCKER reporting:

That song, "Guilty in Here," arrives late in Miranda Lambert's sophomore album
"Crazy Ex-Girlfriend." It's the ninth of 11 tracks. The fact that this
singer/songwriter felt free to bury such a terrific song is a measure of her
competence and cleverness. "Guilty in Here" is a fine example of modern
country rock in its melody, and an even better example of old-fashioned
country music lyric writing. Her central play on words, "Is it guilty in here
or is it me?" is a chorus both catchy and revelatory. Lambert wants you to
think of her as a bad girl who'd like to find a nice guy. And another one of
her lines, "The good ones all got wedding rings, and the young ones are just
too dumb," may give heart to some nice, middle-aged single men out there.

For the rest of us, there's Lambert's wistful moodiness and her knack for
describing small town Texas life.

(Soundbite of "Famous in a Small Town")

Ms. LAMBERT: (Singing) They say life is so much sweeter
Through the telephoto lens of fame
Around here you get just as much attention
Cheering at the high school football game

I dreamed of going to Nashville
Put my money down and placed my bid
But I just got the first buck of the season
I made the front page of the Turnertown Gazette

Every last one, route one, rural hearts got a story to tell
Every grandma, in-law, ex-girlfriend maybe knows us just a little too well
Whether you're late for church or you're stuck in jail,
Hey, word's going to get around
Everybody dies famous in a small town

(End of soundbite)

TUCKER: "Famous in a Small Town" is like crossing John Mellencamp with the TV
show "Friday Night Lights." You believe Lambert grew up in Lindale, Texas,
about 80 miles east of Dallas.

You also believe she has a burning ambition and a hot temper. That's what the
title song of her 2005 debut album "Kerosene" was all about, and it's what she
confirms in the title song of this new one, "Crazy Ex-Girlfriend." Jealous and
ornery, she spits out fine, vindictive lines, including, "To a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. Bam."

(Soundbite of "Crazy Ex-Girlfriend")

Ms. LAMBERT: (Singing) It took me five bars, some 30 license plates
I saw her Mustang and my eyes filled up with rage
I brought my pistol, but I ain't some kind of fool
So I walked right in bare-handed,
She was on his arm while he was playing pool
Just like I used to do

She kissed him while I got a beer,
She didn't think I'd show up here
I'm a crazy ex-girlfriend

(End of soundbite)

TUCKER: Miranda Lambert has a nice plaintive voice, a little like early
period Barbara Mandrell. She's diminutive, pretty and compact. Look at her
quickly and she resembles a country version of Kristen Chenoweth.

Lambert's songs also suggest a rather cynical view of human nature. You might
ascribe that to the fact that both her parents are private investigators,
which may also have made young Miranda a good trained observer of human
behavior and her surrounding, always invaluable for an artist. So is a sense
of humor.

(Soundbite of "Dry Town")

Ms. LAMBERT: (Singing) Well, the road was hot and flat as a ruler
A good 100 miles between me and Medulla
That vinyl top wasn't getting no cooler,
So I stopped at a Quickie Snack

I figured I'd need about a sixth of Miller
And one of them things so I wouldn't spill 'er
And I asked the girl if the beer was in the back
She said:

It's a dry town,
No beer, no liquor for miles around
I'd give a nickel for a sip or two
To wash me down
Out of this dry town

So I turn right around...

(End of soundbite)

TUCKER: What few songs Miranda Lambert didn't write on this album are solid
covers by female writers as good as various as Carlene Carter and Patty
Griffin. She's not pursuing a "one of the rednecks" image the way another
recent star, Gretchen Wilson, has. Her music owes more to a Texas
counterculturalist like Willie Nelson than the Nashville establishment that's
now embracing her. The best thing about Miranda Lambert is that you get the
distinct feeling that even if she wasn't putting albums in at number one,
she'd still be singing at a small club about loading a shotgun in preparation
for meeting a cheating boyfriend and saying, as she does in one song on this
album, that little girls like her are made of gunpowder and lead.

GROSS: Ken Tucker is editor at large for Entertainment Weekly. He reviewed
"Crazy Ex-Girlfriend" by Miranda Lambert.

(Credits)

GROSS: I'm Terry Gross.
Transcripts are created on a rush deadline, and accuracy and availability may vary. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Please be aware that the authoritative record of Fresh Air interviews and reviews are the audio recordings of each segment.